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Abstract. As a contribution to the challenge of building game-playing AI systems,
we develop and analyse a formal language for representing and reasoning about
strategies. Our logical language builds on the existing general Game Description
Language (GDL) and extends it by a standard modality for linear time along
with two dual connectives to express preferences when combining strategies. The
semantics of the language is provided by a standard state-transition model. As such,
problems that require reasoning about games can be solved by the standard methods
for reasoning about actions and change. We also endow the language with a specific
semantics by which strategy formulas are understood as move recommendations
for a player. To illustrate how our formalism supports automated reasoning about
strategies, we demonstrate two example methods of implementation: first, we for-
malise the semantic interpretation of our language in conjunction with game rules
and strategy rules in the Situation Calculus; second, we show how the reasoning
problem can be solved with Answer Set Programming.
Keywords: strategic reasoning, reasoning about actions, general game playing
1. Introduction
Strategic reasoning has been a major research theme in game theory.
However, “much of game theory is about the question whether strategic
equilibria exist”, as Johan van Benthem points out, “but there are
hardly any explicit languages for defining, comparing, or combining
strategies” (van Benthem, 2008). The intrinsic difficulty of modelling
strategic reasoning is that reasoning about strategies is not purely
deductive but combines temporal reasoning, counterfactual reasoning,
reasoning about actions and preferences, and multi-agent interaction.
If any logic is used, such a logic must be able to support these reasoning
mechanisms.
In recent years a number of specific logical formalisms have been
proposed for specifying strategic behaviour of agents in multi-agent
systems (Pauly and Parikh, 2003; van der Hoek et al., 2005; Ramanu-
jam and Simon, 2008; Chatterjee et al., 2010; Mogavero et al., 2010).
These frameworks offer modelling facilities and inference mechanisms
for specifying strategy reasoning in multi-agent systems. At the same
time, the conceptually simple, general Game Description Language
c© 2018 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
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2(GDL) has been developed as a practical language for encoding the
rules of arbitrary games so that they can be understood by general
game-playing systems, whose task is to learn to play unknown games
without human intervention (Genesereth et al., 2005; Thielscher, 2011).
In this paper, we explore the middle ground between pure game
specification languages like GDL on the one hand, and existing expres-
sive formalisms for strategic reasoning on the other hand. Our main
contributions can be summarised as follows:
1. We show how a simple extension of GDL using a standard modality
for linear time suffices to describe strategies in addition to the mere
rules of a game, and we present a specific semantics by which formu-
las in this language can be understood as move recommendations
for a player.
2. We enrich our language by two preference operators, respectively
called prioritised disjunction and prioritised conjunction, and show
how to use them to describe strategies that are complete (i.e., pro-
vide a move recommendation in every state) and deterministic (i.e.,
move recommendations are always unique).
3. We demonstrate two example methods of implementation: a for-
malisation of the semantic interpretation of our language in the
Situation Calculus (Reiter, 2001) and a translation of a subset of
our language into Answer Set Programming (Gelfond, 2008).
These results are accompanied by a thorough mathematical analysis of
the language and its semantics, in particular with regard to our novel
preference operators. The advantage of our framework is to allow for
concise but complete representations of games and strategic behaviour
of agents so that the approach promises to be practically useful for the
design of game-playing agents. We will use a simple game scenario as
a running example to explain the basic concepts and to demonstrate
how our language can be used to write strategies for game-playing
agents. Our results lay the foundations for a variety of applications
of automated reasoning about strategies in AI systems, including the
following:
− A general game player can be fed not only with the mere rules of
a new game but also with declarative descriptions of tailor-made
strategies.
− General game players can use a high-level, declarative representa-
tion of their strategies as the basis for learning, maintaining, and
reasoning about them.
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3− Players can also use the language and its inference mechanism to
represent, revise and reason with their beliefs about their oppo-
nents’ strategies.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we
will begin our technical exposition with the definition of a simple state
transition semantics for games. In Section 3, we will then define the
semantic concept of a strategy within this framework, and in Section 4
we will develop a formal game specification language based on GDL
for describing both game rules and strategies in a concise manner. In
Section 5, we will introduce the two preference connectives and show
how to use these to combine strategies into more complex ones. In
Section 6, we demonstrate how to verify if a strategy could bring out
an expected outcome with the model-based approach. In Section 7, we
will encode the semantic interpretation of our language in conjunction
with game rules and strategy rules in the Situation Calculus and also
illustrate how the reasoning problem can be solved with Answer Set
Programming. We conclude with a discussion of related work.
2. State Transition Games
To set the stage for our work, we first define formally a general state
transition model for games.
DEFINITION 1. A state transition game G is a tuple (N,W,A, w¯,
t, l, u, g), where
1. N is a non-empty finite set of players;
2. W is a non-empty set of states (possible worlds);
3. A =
⋃
i∈N A
i, where Ai is a non-empty finite set of actions for
player i ∈ N ;
4. w¯ ∈W , representing the initial state;
5. l ⊆W ×A is a binary legality relation, describing what actions are
allowed in which states;
6. u : A × W 7→ W is an update function, specifying the state
transitions;
7. g : N 7→ 2W is a goal function, specifying the winning states of
each agent;
8. t ⊆W , representing the terminal states.
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4To keep our formalism as simple as possible, we assume that all
actions are performed asynchronously, each by a single player (although
games need not be turn-taking). We also assume that different agents
have different actions, that is, Ai ∩Aj = ∅ for any i 6= j, but of course
two actions may have the same effects.
A sequence w0
a0→ w1
a1→ · · ·
am−1
→ wm is called a complete path if
1. w0 = w¯, wm ∈ t, and wj ∈W for all 0 < j < m;
2. aj ∈ A for all 0 ≤ j < m;
3. (wj , aj) ∈ l for all 0 ≤ j < m; and
4. u(aj , wj) = wj+1 for all 0 ≤ j < m.
Any segment wk
ak→ wk+1
ak+1
→ · · ·
al−1
→ wl, where k ≤ l, of a complete
path is called a reachable path. We let P(G) denote all reachable paths
in a state transition game G. Note that a single state without action
can be a reachable path (i.e., where k = l). We call such a singleton
path w ∈W ∩ P(G) a reachable state.
A state-action pair (w, a) is called a reachable legal move (or simply
a move) in G if there is a w′ such that w
a
→ w′ is a reachable path. The
set of all such moves in G is denoted by Ω(G). More formally,
Ω(G) = {(w, a) : there is w′ ∈W such that w
a
→ w′ ∈ P(G)} (1)
Furthermore, the moves for player i are denoted by Ωi(G):
Ωi(G) = {(w, a) ∈ Ω(G) : a ∈ Ai} (2)
For convenience, we let
li(w) = {a : (w, a) ∈ Ωi(G)} (3)
To facilitate the presentation of our framework, we will use as our
running example a simple two-player game, which we call CrossDot
game1.
EXAMPLE 1. (CrossDot Game) Two players take turns in placing
either a cross “×” (player 1) or a dot “·” (player 2) into an empty box
in a line of m, where m ≥ 2:
222 · · · 2︸ ︷︷ ︸
m
1 The game can be viewed as a variation of tic-tac-toe or a simplified Gomoku
game.
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5Each box can contain at most one object. The first player to successfully
fill k (1 < k ≤ m) consecutive boxes will end and win the game, where
k is arbitrary but fixed. If all boxes have been filled without a winner,
the game ends with a tie. We assume that the “×”-player goes first.
To describe the scenario in terms of the state transition game, let
N = {1, 2} be the players and
W ={(t1, t2, x1, x2, . . . , xm) : t1, t2∈{0, 1} & x1, . . . , xm∈{2,⊠,⊡}}
the set of possible states, where t1, t2 specify whose turn it is (ti = 1
if it is player i’s turn; otherwise ti = 0) and x1, . . . , xm indicate the
status of the boxes. The initial state is w¯ = (1, 0,2,2, · · · ,2).
We write aij to denote the action of player i marking the jth box.
Let Ai = {aij : i ∈ N & 1 ≤ j ≤ m}. We refrain from explicitly listing
the legality relation, the update function, and the terminal and goal
states for the players as this is possible but considerably lengthy even
for a very simple game like this; the syntactic axiomatision of this game
given in the following section will be much more concise and practical.
Let us just pick some random examples: For m = 4 and k = 2, the state
(1, 0,⊡,⊠,⊠,⊡) is a terminal state and also a goal state for player 1.
Under our assumption that player 1 takes the first move, the state-
action pair ((1, 0,⊡,2,⊠,2), a12), say, satisfies the legality relation,
whereas ((1, 0,⊡,2,⊠,2), a22) does not because it is not player 2’s
turn at this stage. As an example of the update function we have
u(a12, (1, 0,⊡,2,⊠,2)) = (0, 1,⊡,⊠,⊠,2).
For future reference, by Gm,k
CrossDot
we denote the instance of our game
that consists of m boxes and has winning length k.
3. Strategies in State Transition Games
In a multi-agent game environment, agents strive to achieve their goals.
How individual agents act is determined by their strategies: At a state
of a game, the strategies that the agent applies determine which actions
the agent will take. For example, a strategy of a player in the game of
chess reflects which moves the player would play in certain positions
that can be reached according to the standard chess rules. In terms of
the state transition game, a strategy of a player can be defined as a
relation between game states and (legal) actions the player will perform.
DEFINITION 2. A strategy S of player i is a subset of W ×Ai such
that S ⊆ Ωi(G).
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6Intuitively, a strategy of a player specifies which actions the player
should take in which states. Note that our concept of strategy is signif-
icantly different from the ones in the context of alternating-time tem-
poral logic (ATL) (Alur et al., 2002; van der Hoek et al., 2005; Walther
et al., 2007). In ATL, a strategy is a function that maps each state (or
a sequence of states) to an action. In other words, a strategy specifies
which action has to do exactly in each state or each history of states.
However, our concept of strategy can express a “rough idea” of what to
do. A strategy may suggest no action, one action or several actions to
do in each state. A player might apply several strategies in one game. A
single strategy does not necessarily determine the moves for all possible
legal positions of a game. In the later sections, we will further develop
a technology to combine and refine strategies in order to generate a
strategy with desirable properties.
3.1. Properties of Strategies
We say that a strategy S is valid if S 6= ∅. A strategy S of player i
is complete if for each reachable state w ∈ W ∩ P(G), there is a move
(w, ai) ∈ S unless li(w) = ∅. In other words, a complete strategy
provides the player with a “complete” guideline that always provides
the player with one or more suggestions how to act when it is his move.
A strategy S is deterministic if for any (w, a) ∈ S and (w, a′) ∈ S, we
have a = a′. A strategy is functional if it is complete and deterministic.
An agent with a functional strategy knows precisely what to do in any
reachable game state. For instance, if an agent i ∈ N has a default
action ai0 ∈ A
i that is always legal in any reachable state, then the
following simple strategy for this player is complete and deterministic,
hence functional:
Si = {(w, ai0) : w ∈W ∩ P(G)}
EXAMPLE 2. Consider an instance, G4,2
CrossDot
, of the CrossDot game.
The following is an example of strategies for player 1 that intuitively
says “fill a box next to one you have marked before”:
S1 = {((1, 0,⊠,2,⊡,2), a12), ((1, 0,⊠,2,2,⊡), a
1
2),
((1, 0,⊡,⊠,2,2), a13), ((1, 0,2,⊠,⊡,2), a
1
1),
((1, 0,2,⊠,2,⊡), a11), ((1, 0,2,⊠,2,⊡), a
1
3),
((1, 0,⊡,2,⊠,2), a12), ((1, 0,⊡,2,⊠,2), a
1
4),
((1, 0,2,⊡,⊠,2), a14), ((1, 0,2,2,⊠,⊡), a
1
2),
((1, 0,⊡,2,2,⊠), a13), ((1, 0,2,⊡,2,⊠), a
1
3) }
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7It is easy to see that the strategy is valid but neither complete nor
deterministic.
4. Strategy Representation and Semantics
The above example shows that directly representing a strategy in a
state transition game requires to list every move that complies with
the strategy. In the following, we develop a syntactical representation
that allows to describe a strategy much more concisely.
4.1. Formal Game Specification Language
We first present a logic-based, general game description language with
linear time.
DEFINITION 3. Consider a propositional modal language L with
these components:
− a non-empty finite set Φ of propositional variables;
− a non-empty finite set N of agent symbols;
− a non-empty finite set Ai of action symbols for each i ∈ N ;
− propositional connectives ¬, ∧, ∨, → and ≡;2
− pseudo-function symbols does(.), legal(.), and wins(.);
− modal operator ©;
− special propositional symbols init and terminal.
Formulas in L are defined as follows:
ϕ := p | ¬ϕ | ϕ∧ϕ | ©ϕ | does(a) | legal(a) | wins(i) | init | terminal
where p ∈ Φ, i ∈ N and a ∈ A =
⋃
i∈N A
i.
Note that we overload N and Ai as they occur in both syntax and se-
mantics. They can be distinguished from the context. As in Definition 1,
we assume that Ai ∩Aj = ∅ if i 6= j.
We call does, legal and wins pseudo-functions because formally each
instance does(a), legal(a) or wins(i) is taken to be an individual propo-
sitional symbol. This language is a direct adaptation of the general
2 Only ¬ and ∧ are treated as primitives.
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8Game Description Language (Genesereth et al., 2005) and allows to
describe games in a compact way.
EXAMPLE 1 (continued)3 We use the propositional symbols pij to rep-
resent the fact that box j is filled with i’s marker, where i ∈ {1, 2} and
j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. In addition, we use two specific propositional symbols
turn(1) and turn(2) to represent players’ turns, respectively. Putting
all the propositional symbols together, we have ΦCrossDot = {p
i
j : 1 ≤
i ≤ 2 & 1 ≤ j ≤ m} ∪ {turn(i) : i = 1 or 2}. With this, we are able to
describe the game rules in our logical language.
To begin with, the following rules specify the initial game state:
init → ¬pij for all i ∈ N and j ≤ m (4)
init → turn(1) ∧ ¬turn(2) (5)
The following statement defines the winning conditions: Player i wins
if there is j such that j + k − 1 ≤ m and pij ∧ · · · ∧ p
i
j+k−1, i.e.
wins(i) ≡
m−k+1∨
j=1
j+k−1∧
l=j
pil (6)
With this, the condition for termination is:
terminal ≡ wins(1) ∨wins(2) ∨
m∧
j=1
(p1j ∨ p
2
j) (7)
As before, let aij denote the action of player i filling box j. Legality of
the actions of each player i can be described thus:
¬(p1j ∨ p
2
j) ∧ turn(i) ∧ ¬terminal ≡ legal(a
i
j) (8)
The effects of the actions are given by4
pij ∨ does(a
i
j) ≡ ©p
i
j (9)
turn(1)→©¬turn(1) ∧©turn(2) (10)
turn(2)→©¬turn(2) ∧©turn(1) (11)
Let Σm,k
CrossDot
be the set of axioms (4)–(11).
3 While all examples in this paper are based on the CrossDot game, some
examples are specifically numbered just for the purpose of cross-referencing.
4 To avoid too much complexity, we follow (Genesereth et al., 2005) not offer-
ing any solution to the frame problem here. Game descriptions simply include all
necessary frame axioms.
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9In the following, we interpret the language based on the state tran-
sition model. Give a state transition game G = (N,W,A, w¯, t, l, u, g)
(see Definition 1), a valuation function v : W 7→ 2Φ specifies which
atom propositions are true at each state. Propositional formulas and
their truth values can be defined accordingly.
DEFINITION 4. Let G = (N,W,A, w¯, t, l, u, g) be a state transition
game and v a valuation function. We call the pair M = (G, v) a state
transition model. Let δ = w0
a0→ w1
a1→ · · ·
am−1
→ wm ∈ P(G) be a
reachable path in G and ϕ a formula. We say that δ satisfies ϕ under
M (written M, δ |= ϕ) according to the following definition:
M, δ |= p iff p ∈ v(w0) (p ∈ Φ)
M, δ |= does(a) iff a = a0
M, δ |= init iff w0 = w¯
M, δ |= terminal iff w0 ∈ t
M, δ |= legal(a) iff (w0, a) ∈ l
M, δ |= wins(i) iff w0 ∈ g(i)
M, δ |= ¬ϕ iff M, δ 6|= ϕ
M, δ |= ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 iff M, δ |= ϕ1 and M, δ |= ϕ2
M, δ |=©ϕ iff M,w1
a1→ · · ·
am−1
→ wm |= ϕ
It is worth clarifying that in the limit case m = 0 (i.e., δ = w0) we
have that M, δ |= does(a) and M, δ |=©ϕ hold for any a and ϕ.
A formula ϕ is valid in model M , denoted M |= ϕ, if it is satisfied
by any reachable path in the game, that is, M, δ |= ϕ for all δ ∈ P(G).
Let Σ be a set of sentences in L, then M is a model of Σ if M |= ϕ for
all ϕ ∈ Σ.
OBSERVATION 1. Consider the CrossDot game G = Gm,k
CrossDot
intro-
duced in Example 1. Let v be a valuation function such that for each
state w = (t1, t2, x1, · · · , xm) ∈ W , v(w) = {turn(i) : ti = 1} ∪ {p
1
j :
xj = ⊠ & 1 ≤ j ≤ m} ∪ {p
2
j : xj = ⊡ & 1 ≤ j ≤ m}. Let M = (G, v).
Then M is a model of Σm,k
CrossDot
(see equations (4)–(11)).
Proof: Given any reachable path δ = w0
a0→ w1
a1→ · · ·
ae−1
→ we,
we only have to verify that each axiom in Σm,k
CrossDot
is satisfied by δ
in M . This is straightforward. Consider for instance the proof that
M, δ |= init → ¬pij for any i ∈ N and j < m: If w0 6= w¯, this holds
trivially because M, δ |= ¬init. If w0 = w¯, then M, δ |= init and by the
definition of v, pij 6∈ v(w0), hence M, δ |= ¬p
i
j for any i ∈ N and j < m.
The other axioms can be verified similarly.
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10
In order to develop a syntactical representation for strategies, we
introduce the following specific concepts. Let δ = w0
a0→ w1
a1→ · · ·
am−1
→
wm. We call δ a reachable path starting with the move (w0, a0). The set
of all the reachable paths in game G that starts with (w, a) is denoted
by (w, a);. Given a state transition model M = (G, v), for any move
(w, a) ∈ Ω(G), a formula ϕ is valid under move (w, a), denoted by
M |=(w,a) ϕ, if M, δ |= ϕ for all reachable path δ ∈ (w, a)
;.
EXAMPLE 3. Consider the same instance of the CrossDot game
G4,2
CrossDot
as in Example 2. Let M be the state transition model de-
fined in Observation 1 for the case m = 4 and k = 2. Assume that
(w, a) = ((1, 0,⊠,⊡,2,2), a13). It is easy to verify the following:
M |=(w,a) legal(a
1
4)
M 6|=(w,a) does(a
2
3)
M |=(w,a) ¬(p
1
3 ∨ p
2
3) ∧©p
1
3 ∧©(legal(a
2
4) ∧ does(a
2
4))
M |=(w,a) ©© terminal
4.2. Describing Strategies
We now turn to the syntactical representation of strategies using the
language introduced above. For any state transition model M = (G, v)
and formula ϕ ∈ L, let
Si(ϕ) = {(w, a) ∈ Ωi(G) :M |=(w,a) ϕ} (12)
In other words, Si(ϕ) comprises all moves for player i under which ϕ
is valid.
DEFINITION 5. Given a state transition model M , let S be a strategy
of player i according to Definition 2. A formula ϕ in L is a represen-
tation of S iff S = Si(ϕ).
In the following, we will call “strategy” both a set of moves (i.e., a
strategy in the sense of Definition 2) and its representation (using L).
They should be easy to distinguish from the context. Note that a for-
mula ϕ ∈ L can represent different strategies for different players. For
instance, the tautology ⊤ can be a strategy of player i, i.e., Si(⊤), that
allows the player to take any reachable moves at any reachable state.
Another example is does(ai), where ai ∈ Ai. If representing a strategy
of player i, it means to take ai only at any reachable state. However, if
JPL_ZT.tex; 4/09/2018; 22:30; p.10
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representing a strategy of other players rather than i, it means to do
nothing.
While the language we consider in this paper is propositional and
finite, a state transition game can have infinitely many worlds which
cannot be distinguished by the propositions that hold in them. A
strategy that assigns different actions to two indistinguishable worlds
cannot be described in our language. However, every strategy that is
Markovian in the following sense does have a representation in L.
DEFINITION 6. Given a state transition modelM = (G, v), a strategy
S is Markovian if for all (w1, a) ∈ S and w2 ∈ P(G) such that v(w1) =
v(w2), (w2, a) ∈ S.
PROPOSITION 1. Given a state transition model M = (G, v) of L,
any Markovian strategy S of a player has a representation in L.
Proof: For each (w, a) ∈ S, since the set Φ of propositional variables
is finite, v(w) and Φ \ v(w) are both finite. Thus the following is a
well-formed propositional formula:
ϕ(w, a) = (
∧
p∈v(w)
p) ∧ (
∧
p∈Φ\v(w)
¬p) ∧ does(a) (13)
Again A being finite implies the set {ϕ(w, a) : (w, a) ∈ S} to be
finite even though S may be infinite. Therefore the following is also a
well-formed propositional formula:
ϕ =
∨
(w,a)∈S
ϕ(w, a)
Now we show ϕ is a representation of S. Obviously, for any (w, a) ∈
S, M |=(w,a) ϕ. For any (w, a) ∈ Ω
i(G), where i is the player under
consideration, assume thatM |=(w,a) ϕ. By the construction of ϕ, there
is a move (w′, a′) ∈ S such that
M |=(w,a) (
∧
p∈v(w′)
p) ∧ (
∧
p∈Φ\v(w′)
¬p) ∧ does(a′)
It turns out that v(w) = v(w′). Since S is Markovian, we have (w, a′) ∈
S. Note thatM |=(w,a) does(a
′) implies a = a′ by Definition 4. We then
have (w, a) ∈ S, as desired.
Note that Markovian strategies are history-independent. If we want
to specify strategies in which move choices depend on the history of a
game, then we need to extend our language with syntactic means to
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talk about past states. This can be done by adding the inverse of the
operator ©, written ©−1, to denote that some property holds in “the
previous state”. We leave this extension for future work.
The reader is reminded that formulas in our language have been
endowed with two different semantics. If it is used to represent a prop-
erty, it has a truth value as normal propositional formula. If a formula
is used to represent a strategy, then it no longer has a truth value but
represents a set of moves for a player.
The following observation shows how our language can be used to
describe a useful strategy for our running example. Compared to its
semantical representation (cf. Example 2), the syntactical expression
of the strategy is much more compact and meaningful.
OBSERVATION 2. Strategy S1 from Example 2 is represented by
ϕ =
∨
1<j≤4
(p1j−1∧¬p
1
j∧¬p
2
j∧does(a
1
j ))∨
∨
1≤j<4
(¬p1j∧¬p
2
j∧p
1
j+1∧does(a
1
j ))
Proof: First we show S1 ⊆ S1(ϕ). This can be done by verifying
M |=(w,a) ϕ one by one for each (w, a) ∈ S
1. For instance, consider
w = (1, 0,⊠,2,⊡,2, ) and a = a12. Then M |=(w,a) p
1
1 ∧¬p
1
2∧¬p
2
2 and
M |=(w,a) does(a
1
2). Thus M |=(w,a) ϕ.
In order to show that S1(ϕ) ⊆ S1, we can prove that for each reach-
able move (w, a) of player 1, (w, a) 6∈ S1 implies M 6|=(w,a) ϕ. This can
be done by enumerating all reachable moves in Ω1(G4,2
CrossDot
) \ S1. For
instance, let w0 = (1, 0,⊠,⊡,2,2) and a0 = a
1
3. Obviously, (w0, a0) is
a reachable move and (w0, a0) 6∈ S
1. To showM 6|=(w0,a0) ϕ, consider the
reachable path δ = w0
a0→ w1, where w1 = (0, 1,⊠,⊡,⊠,2). It is easy
to verify that M, δ |= ¬p12 ∧ ¬p
1
4 ∧ does(a
1
3) while M, δ |= ¬does(a
′) for
any a′ 6= a13. Thus we have M, δ 6|= ϕ. We then yield thatM 6|=(w0,a0) ϕ.
Other cases can be verified similarly.
The above observation shows that we can still use our logical sense
to design a strategy despite the significant differences of semantics
between a propositional formula and a strategy representation. When
doing so it is important to keep it in mind that a propositional formula
bears a very different meaning when understood as a strategy rather
than a state description. In the following we demonstrate the speciality
of strategy representation with a few examples based on the CrossDot
game G = G4,2
CrossDot
.
1. One formula can represent different strategies for different players:
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S1(©p11) = {(1, 0,2, x2, x3, x4), a
1
1)∈P(G) : x2, x3, x4∈{2,⊠,⊡}}
∪{(1, 0,⊠,2, x3, x4), a
1
2) ∈ P(G) : x3, x4 ∈ {2,⊠,⊡}}
∪{(1, 0,⊠, x2,2, x4), a
1
3) ∈ P(G) : x2, x4 ∈ {2,⊠,⊡}}
∪{(1, 0,⊠, x2, x3,2), a
1
4) ∈ P(G) : x2, x3 ∈ {2,⊠,⊡}}
S2(©p11) = {(0, 1,⊠,2, x3, x4), a
2
2) ∈ P(G) : x3, x4 ∈ {2,⊠,⊡}}
∪{(0, 1,⊠, x2,2, x4), a
2
3) ∈ P(G) : x2, x4 ∈ {2,⊠,⊡}}
∪{(0, 1,⊠, x2, x3,2), a
2
4) ∈ P(G) : x2, x3 ∈ {2,⊠,⊡}}
In other words, if ©p11 represents a strategy of player 1, it means
that player 1 is to fill the first box with his marker if the box
is currently empty or to fill any other empty box if the box has
already been filled with a cross whenever it is his turn. However, if
the formula ©p11 represents a strategy of player 2, it means player
2 wishes the first box to be filled by player 1. In this case, he waits
for the states to come and then do whatever is feasible to him.
2. Forcing another player into a particular action:
S1(©does(a21))
= {(1, 0,2,2, x3, x4), a
1
2) ∈ P(G) : x3, x4 ∈ {⊠,⊡}}
∪{(1, 0,2, x2,2, x4), a
1
3) ∈ P(G) : x2, x4 ∈ {⊠,⊡}}
∪{(1, 0,2, x2, x3,2), a
1
4) ∈ P(G) : x2, x3 ∈ {⊠,⊡}}
In general, a player does not have control on the other player’s
actions. But a player may be able to create a situation in which the
opponent has no choice other than the desired action. In the above
example, player 1 is enforcing a situation in which player 2 has no
other option but to perform a21 when it becomes his turn.
3. Thinking forward:
S2((©(¬does(a11))→©© does(a
2
1))
= {(0, 1,2,2,2,⊠), a22), (0, 1,2,2,2,⊠), a
2
3),
(0, 1,2,2,⊠,2), a22), (0, 1,2,2,⊠,2), a
2
4),
(0, 1,2,⊠,2,2), a23), (0, 1,2,⊠,2,2), a
2
4)}
This is a strategy for player 2 to try to find an action so that “he
can fill box 1 in his next turn as long as player 1 will not fill it
beforehand.” Note that S2(©© does(a21)) = ∅ because he can do
nothing to guarantee that does(a21) is doable in his next turn.
4. Try anything to win the game within one step:
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S1(©wins(1))
= {(1, 0,⊠,2,⊡,2), a12), (1, 0,⊠,2,2,⊡), a
1
2),
(1, 0,2,⊠,⊡,2), a11), (1, 0,2,⊠,2,⊡), a
1
1),
(1, 0,2,⊠,2,⊡), a13), (1, 0,⊡,2,⊠,2), a
1
2),
(1, 0,2,2,⊠,⊡), a12), (1, 0,⊡,2,2,⊠), a
1
3),
(1, 0,2,⊡,2,⊠), a13)}
This is a simple strategy for player 1 that aims to try any available
action to win the game in one step.
We have seen from the above examples that even though a strategy
rule is written in the syntax of (temporal) propositional formulas, its
semantics is significantly different from propositional logic therefore we
must be very cautious when we start to use the language to design
game strategies.
To complete this section, we present a property of our strategy
representation for later use.
LEMMA 1. Given a state transition model M , for each player i,
1. Si(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) = S
i(ϕ1) ∩ S
i(ϕ2)
2. Si(ϕ1) ∪ S
i(ϕ2) ⊆ S
i(ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2)
Proof: To prove (1), assume that (w, a) ∈ Si(ϕ1∧ϕ2). It follows that
a ∈ Ai andM |=(w,a) ϕ1∧ϕ2. Then for each reachable path δ ∈ (w, a)
;,
we have M, δ |= ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2, which implies M, δ |= ϕ1 and M, δ |= ϕ2. It
turns out that M |=(w,a) ϕ1 and M |=(w,a) ϕ2. We get (w, a) ∈ S
i(ϕ1)
and (w, a) ∈ Si(ϕ2). The other direction is similar.
To prove (2), assume that (w, a) ∈ Si(ϕ1) ∪ S
i(ϕ2). Without loss
of generality, suppose that (w, a) ∈ Si(ϕ1), which implies a ∈ A
i and
M |=(w,a) ϕ1. Hence, M, δ |= ϕ1 for each reachable path δ ∈ (w, a)
;.
It follows that M, δ |= ϕ1 ∨ϕ2. Thus we yield M |=(w,a) ϕ1 ∨ϕ2. Given
that a ∈ Ai, we conclude (w, a) ∈ Si(ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2).
5. Strategy Composition
As mentioned in the introduction, the main motivation of this work is
to introduce a formal logical language for defining, comparing and com-
bining strategies. We have provided our formal definition of strategies
in both syntactical and semantical levels in the previous sections. To
facilitate the composition of strategies, in this section we extend our
language by two specific connectives, called prioritised disjunction and
prioritised conjunction, respectively.
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5.1. Prioritised Disjunction and Conjunction
The idea behind these two new connectives is the following. The priori-
tised disjunction “▽” extends the choice of actions such that if a first
strategy fails to apply then a second one offers more options, and if
that fails too then a third strategy may offer more options still, and so
on. Conversely, the prioritised conjunction “△” narrows down the choice
of actions: if a first strategy allows too many options, then a second
strategy may be used to constrain these options, a third strategy may
narrow down the options even further, and so on—up to the point
where the next strategy in line would lead to empty option.
DEFINITION 7. The set of strategy rules is the smallest set such
that
1. a formula in L is a strategy rule;
2. if r1, . . . , rm are strategy rules, then so is r1▽r2▽ · · ·▽rm;
3. if r1, . . . , rm are strategy rules, then so is r1△r2△ · · ·△rm.
Note that the new strategy connectives are introduced as macros
rather than as additional connectives in the language L. This is so
because we do not want to allow the nesting of the strategy connectives
with logical connectives (while nested strategy rules are allowed). For
instance, (ϕ1 △ ψ1)▽(ϕ2 △ ψ2) is a syntactically correct strategy rule
while ϕ→ (ψ1▽ψ2) is not.
5.2. Semantics of Strategy Rules
Given a strategy S, we let S↾w= {(w, a) : (w, a) ∈ S}, i.e., the set of
all the moves at state w specified by S.
DEFINITION 8. Let r be a strategy rule. We define Si(r) recursively
on the structure of r as follows:
1. If r = ϕ ∈ L, then Si(r) = Si(ϕ).
2. If r = r1▽r2▽ · · ·▽rm, then (w, a) ∈ S
i(r) iff there exists k (1≤
k ≤ m) such that (w, a) ∈ Si(rk) and
⋃
j<k S
i(rj) ↾w= ∅.
3. If r = r1△r2△ · · · △rm, then (w, a) ∈ S
i(r) iff there exists k (1≤
k ≤ m) such that
a) (w, a) ∈
⋂
j≤k S
i(rj) and
b) k = m or
⋂
j≤k+1 S
i(rj) ↾w= ∅.
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Intuitively, r1▽r2▽ · · ·▽rm represents a strategy that combines strate-
gies r1, r2, . . . , rm in such a way that a strategy rule rk becomes appli-
cable only if none of the higher prioritised rules rj(j < k) is applicable.
r1△r2△· · ·△rm tries to apply as many strategy rules all together as
possible but gives higher priority to the left rules than the right rules
if conflicts occur.
The following observations show that the connective ▽ is indeed a
kind of prioritised disjunction and the connective △ is indeed a kind of
prioritised conjunction.
LEMMA 2. Given a state transition model M , for each player i,
1. Si(r1) ⊆ S
i(r1▽r2)
2. Si(r1 △ r2) ⊆ S
i(r1)
3. If Si(r1) = ∅, then S
i(r1 ▽ r2) = S
i(r2).
4. If Si(r2) = ∅, then S
i(r1 △ r2) = S
i(r1).
5. Si(ϕ1▽(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2)) = S
i(ϕ1)
6. Si((ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2)▽ϕ2) ⊆ S
i(ϕ2)
7. Si(ϕ1 △ (ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2)) = S
i(ϕ1)
8. Si(ϕ2) ⊆ S
i((ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2) △ ϕ2)
Proof: The proof of (1)-(4) is straightforward from Definition 8.
To show (5), let (w, a) ∈ Si(ϕ1▽(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2)). If (w, a) 6∈ S
i(ϕ1), then
by Definition 8, (w, a) ∈ Si(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2). By Lemma 1 (1), this implies
(w, a) ∈ Si(ϕ1)—a contradiction. Hence, (w, a) ∈ S
i(ϕ1). We have
proved Si(ϕ1▽(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2)) ⊆ S
i(ϕ1). The other direction follows (1).
To show (6), let (w, a) ∈ Si((ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2)▽ϕ2). Suppose that (w, a) 6∈
Si(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2), then by Definition 8, we have (w, a) ∈ S
i(ϕ2), as desired.
If, on the other hand, (w, a) ∈ Si(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2), then by Lemma 1 (1) we
also have (w, a) ∈ Si(ϕ2).
To show (7), assume that (w, a) ∈ Si(ϕ1). By Lemma 1 (2), (w, a) ∈
Si(ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2). Hence, (w, a) ∈ S
i(ϕ1)↾w ∩S
i(ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2)↾w, which implies
(w, a) ∈ Si(ϕ1 △ (ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2)). The other direction follows (2).
To show (8), assume that (w, a) ∈ Si(ϕ2). By Lemma 1 (2), (w, a) ∈
Si(ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2). It follows that (w, a) ∈ S
i(ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2)↾w ∩S
i(ϕ2)↾w. By
Definition 8, we have (w, a) ∈ Si((ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2) △ ϕ2).
Note that in the above lemma, only one direction of inclusion in
items (6) and (8) holds. The other direction does not. For instance,
JPL_ZT.tex; 4/09/2018; 22:30; p.16
17
assume that Si(ϕ1) = {(w, a)} and S
i(ϕ2) = {(w, a), (w, b)}. Then
Si(ϕ1 ∧ϕ2) = {(w, a)}. It turns out that S
i((ϕ1 ∧ϕ2)▽ϕ2) = {(w, a)}.
This shows that Si(ϕ2) 6⊆ S
i(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2)▽ϕ2). Furthermore, if S
i(ϕ1) =
{(w, a)} and Si(ϕ2) = ∅. By Lemma 1, we have (w, a) ∈ S
i(ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2).
Thus (w, a) ∈ Si((ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2) △ ϕ2)) 6= ∅, which means that the other
direction of item (8) does not hold.
The following lemma shows that the prioritised disjunction can be
reduced to binary connectives. Interestingly, the prioritised conjunction
does not have such a nice property.
LEMMA 3. Given a state transition model M , for each player i,
Si(r1▽r2▽ · · ·▽rm) = S
i(r1▽(r2▽ · · ·▽rm)) = S
i((r1▽ · · ·▽rm−1)▽rm)
Proof: We will prove the first equation, the other one will be quite
similar. We consider two cases. If Si(r1)↾w= ∅ then
(w, a) ∈ Si(r1▽r2▽ · · ·▽rm)
iff (w, a) ∈ Si(r2▽ · · ·▽rm)
iff (w, a) ∈ Si(r1▽(r2▽ · · ·▽rm))
On the other hand, if Si(r1)↾w 6= ∅ then
(w, a) ∈ Si(r1▽ · · ·▽rm)
iff (w, a) ∈ Si(r1)
iff (w, a) ∈ Si(r1▽(r2▽ · · ·▽rm))
We remark that the prioritised conjunction cannot likewise be re-
duced to binary connectives. In general neither Si(r1△r2 △ · · · △rm) =
Si((r1△ · · · △rm−1)△rm) nor S
i(r1△r2 △ · · · △rm) = S
i(r1△(r2△
· · ·△rm)) is true. For example, let S
i(r1) = {(w, a1), (w, a2)}; S
i(r2) =
∅; and Si(r3) = {(w, a1), (w, a3)}. Then S
i(r1△r2△r3) = S
i(r1) =
{(w, a1), (w, a2)}. But S
i((r1△r2)△r3) = S
i(r1△r3) = {(w, a1)}. On the
other hand, if Si(r2) = {(w, a2), (w, a3)} and S
i(r1) and S
i(r3) are as
before, then we get Si(r1△r2△r3) = {(w, a2)} while S
i(r1△(r2△r3)) =
{(w, a1), (w, a2)}.
As a remedy, we may define a prioritised conjunction by the priori-
tised disjunction as follows:
ϕ△˙ψ =def (ϕ ∧ ψ)▽ϕ
Then we extend it to the multi-argument version in the following way:
ϕ1△˙ϕ2△˙ · · · △˙ϕm =def ((ϕ1△˙ϕ2)△˙ · · ·)△˙ϕm
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Unfortunately the semantics of △˙ coincides with △ in the binary ver-
sion but not in the multi-argument version. We will investigate this
alternative in our future work.
5.3. Complete Strategies and Deterministic Strategies
When we build a software game player, we need to instruct it what
to do in each possible situation. In other words, each player should be
equipped with a functional strategy. In the following, we demonstrate
how to generate a complete and/or deterministic strategy by using our
prioritised connectives.
We say that a strategy rule is consistent for player i if it represents
a valid strategy; a rule is complete for i if it represents a complete
strategy for i; and deterministic for i if it represents a deterministic
strategy for i. Similarly, a strategy rule is functional if it is complete
and deterministic. Note that all these concepts are player-specific.
The following theorems show a number of nice properties of the
prioritised connectives, which give us a guideline for how to design a
strategy with desired properties. The first result deals with consistency
of strategy rules.
THEOREM 1. Given a state transition model M ,
1. r1▽ · · ·▽rm is consistent if and only if there is a k (1≤ k ≤ m)
such that rk is consistent.
2. r1△ · · · △rm is consistent if and only if r1 is consistent.
Proof: To prove (1), let r = r1▽ · · ·▽rm. Assume that S
i(r) is non-
empty for player i, then there is (w, a) ∈ Si(r) such that (w, a) ∈ Si(rk)
for some k, which means that rk is consistent for player i. Conversely,
let k be the smallest number such that Si(rk) is non-empty. This implies
that Si(r1▽ · · ·▽rm) = S
i(rk▽ · · ·▽rm). By the above two lemmas we
have Si(rk) ⊆ S
i(r1▽ · · ·▽rm), which means that r is consistent.
To prove (2), we also let r = r1△ · · · △rm. Obviously if r1 is inconsis-
tent, so is r. Assume that r1 is consistent. Then there is (w, a) ∈ S
i(r1).
Let k be the biggest number such that
⋂
j≤k(S
i(rj) ↾w) 6= ∅. Obviously
k ≥ 1. By Definition 8 we have
⋂
j≤k(S
i(rj) ↾w) ⊆ S
i(r) ↾w. Thus r is
consistent.
The second result shows us how to generate a complete or determin-
istic strategy.
THEOREM 2. Given a state transition model M , for each player i
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1. If r1 or r2 is complete, so is r1▽r2.
2. If r1 is complete, so is r1△ · · · △rm.
3. If r1 and r2 are deterministic, so is r1▽r2.
4. If r1 is deterministic, so is r1△ · · · △rm.
Proof: (1) and (4) are straightforward from Definition (8).
To show (2), assume that r1△ · · · △rm is incomplete. Then there
exists a reachable state w ∈W∩P(G) such that Si(r1△ · · · △rm)↾w= ∅.
By Definition 8, this can happen only if Si(r1)↾w= ∅, which contradicts
the assumption that r1 is complete.
To prove (3), assume that (w, a), (w, a′) ∈ Si(r1▽r2). If S
i(r1)↾w 6= ∅,
we have (w, a), (w, a′) ∈ Si(r1) according to Definition 8. Since r1 is
deterministic, this implies a = a′. On the other hand, if Si(r1)↾w= ∅,
then we have (w, a), (w, a′) ∈ Si(r2)↾w, which also implies a = a
′ since
r2 is deterministic.
Statement (1) in the above theorem provides us with an easy way of
generating a complete strategy: create a trivial complete strategy first
and then combine it with other strategies using the prioritised disjunc-
tion. Note that creating a trivial complete strategy is rather easy: let
the agent do anything available.5 Statement (2) tells us that once we
get a complete strategy, we can further refine the strategy targeting
more specific properties, say deterministic thus functional, using the
prioritised conjunction without losing its completeness. Statement (3)
shows us another feasible way of generating a functional strategy: in-
stead of creating a complete strategy then refine it into a deterministic
one, we can devise a set of specific deterministic strategies first and
then combine them with the prioritised disjunction targeting a complete
strategy. Example 4 demonstrates how the above mentioned approaches
can be applied to the CrossDot game. Before doing that, let’s show
another nice property of the prioritised connectives.
THEOREM 3. Given a state transition model M , for each player i
1. If r1 is complete, then S
i(r1▽ · · ·▽rm) = S
i(r1).
2. If r1 is deterministic, then S
i(r1△ · · · △rm) = S
i(r1).
Proof: To prove (1), we only have to show Si(r1▽ · · ·▽rm) ⊆
Si(r1). Assume that (w, a) ∈ S
i(r1▽ · · ·▽rm). Because r1 is complete,
Si(r1)↾w 6= ∅. By Definition 8 we have (w, a) ∈ S
i(r1).
5 In this case, we might have to give the trivial strategy the lowest priority in the
disjunction.
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To show (2), we need to show that Si(r1) ⊆ S
i(r1△ · · · △rm). If
(w, a) ∈ Si(r1), then S
i(r1)↾w= {(w, a)} since r1 is deterministic. By
Definition 8 it follows that (w, a) ∈ Si(r1△ · · · △rm).
Combining the two statements of this theorem, we can say that if
r1 is functional, then S
i(r1▽ · · ·▽rm)=S
i(r1△ · · · △rm) =S
i(r1). This
means that once a strategy is functional, neither extending nor refining
it with strategies of lower priority has any effect. In fact, our goal
of introducing the prioritised connectives is to facilitate the design of
functional strategies. Once a functional strategy has been obtained,
these connectives automatically stop working.
EXAMPLE 4. Consider the CrossDot game scenario in Example 1.
We define a few strategy rules for player i as follows:
− Fill a box next to a box that contains player i’s mark:
fill nexti =
∨
1<j≤m(¬p
1
j ∧ ¬p
2
j ∧ p
i
j−1 ∧ does(a
i
j)) ∨∨
1≤j<m(¬p
1
j ∧ ¬p
2
j ∧ p
i
j+1 ∧ does(a
i
j))
(14)
− Fill an isolated box (i.e., whose immediate neighbours are empty):
fill isolated i =
∨
1<j<m((¬p
1
j−1 ∧ ¬p
2
j−1) ∧ (¬p
1
j+1 ∧ ¬p
2
j+1)
∧ (¬p1j ∧ ¬p
2
j) ∧ does(a
i
j))
(15)
− Fill any empty box:
fill any i =
∨
1≤j≤m(¬p
1
j ∧ ¬p
2
j ∧ does(a
i
j)) (16)
− Try fill nexti first. If this fails, try fill isolated i, then try fill any i:
combined i = fill nexti ▽ fill isolated i ▽ fill any i (17)
OBSERVATION 3. Let M = (G, v) be the state transition model de-
fined in Observation 1. The strategy rule combined i is complete for
player i.
Proof: We first prove that the strategy fill any i is complete. Assume
an arbitrary reachable state w ∈ W ∩ P(G) such that li(w) 6= ∅
(recall formula (3) for the definition of li and the definition of com-
pleteness of a strategy in Section 3.1). Let aij ∈ l
i(w). It follows that
M |=(w,aij)
legal(aij). By (8), we know that M |=(w,aij)
¬p1j ∧¬p
2
j , hence
M |=(w,aij) ¬p
1
j ∧ ¬p
2
j ∧ does(a
i
j), which implies (w, a
i
j) ∈ S
i(fill any i).
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Therefore fill any i is a complete strategy rule for player i. According
to Theorem 2 (1), we know that the strategy rule combined i is also
complete.
A complete strategy for a player gives the player a feasible option
(if any) for any given situation. However, a software game player could
still be unsure about what to do under a complete strategy if there is
more than one option in the same situation. The prioritised conjunction
provides us with a way to narrow down multiple options.
EXAMPLE 5. For our running example game, let cit =
t∨
j=1
does(aij)
where 1 ≤ t ≤ m (with m being the overall number of boxes as usual),
then cit represents the strategy of i to place an object in any box between
1 and a given number t. Let
thoughtful i = combined i △ cim △ · · · △ c
i
1 (18)
where combined i is the strategy rule defined in Example 4 (cf. (17)).
It is not hard to see that if combined i gives more than one boxes to
fill, thoughtfuli will choose the left most one.
OBSERVATION 4. Let M = (G, v) be the state transition model de-
fined in Observation 1. The strategy rule thoughtful i is functional for
player i.
Proof: By Theorem 2 (2), thoughtful i is complete because combined i
is complete. We prove that thoughtful i is deterministic. Assume that
(w, aij1), (w, a
i
j2
) ∈ Si(thoughtful i)
such that, without loss of generality, j1 ≤ j2. Let t be the smallest num-
ber (between 1 and m) such that H = Si(combined i)↾w∩
m⋂
j=t
Si(cij)↾w
is not empty. Such a t exists because Si(combined i)↾w∩S
i(cim)↾w 6=
∅. By Definition 8, we have (w, aij1) ∈ H and (w, a
i
j2
) ∈ H, hence
(w, aij1), (w, a
i
j2
) ∈ Si(cit)↾w. Hence j1 ≤ j2 ≤ t. If t = 1, then a
i
j1
=
aij2 = a
i
1. Otherwise, i.e. if t > 1, then S
i(combined i)↾w ∩
m⋂
j=t−1
Si(cij)↾w=
∅, which implies that neither (w, aij1) nor (w, a
i
j2
) belongs to Si(cit−1)↾w.
Note that Si(cit−1)↾w= {(w, a
i
j) ∈ P(G) : j ≤ t− 1}. Thus t ≤ j1 ≤ j2.
By the above assumption, we have j1 = j2 = t. We have proved that
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thoughtful i is deterministic, thus it is functional.
To summarise, the prioritised connectives provide a natural way of
refining a strategy. If a strategy is too restricted in that it can only be
applied to few states, it can be extended using prioritised disjunction.
If, on the other hand, a strategy is too generic in that it leaves too many
options, it can be strengthened using prioritised conjunction. Once a
strategy has been functional, further extension or refinement using the
prioritised disjunction or conjunction take no effect as long as give the
existing strategy the highest priority.
6. Reasoning About Strategies
Knowing how to write strategies for a game-playing agent, we now
consider the question whether a strategy meets its goal, for instance,
if it is guaranteed to lead to a winning state or to a desirable state
given the strategies that the other players use. In this section, we
will demonstrate by using our running example how to reason about
strategies within our framework. We also demonstrate how to design a
strategy using the prioritised connectives to meet desired properties.
6.1. Compliance with a strategy
In order to verify whether a strategy can bring about an expected result
for a player in a game, we assume that the player complies with the
strategy all the way through the game and observes the outcome of the
game.
Let M = (G, v) be a state transition model of a game G and S a
strategy of the game for player i. We say thatM (or G) complies with S
by player i if for each reachable move (w, a) of player i in G, (w, a) ∈ S.
In other words, player i follows the strategy S whenever he makes a
move.6
The following observation shows that for any CrossDot game when
k = 2 and m > 2, Player 1 wins as long as he plays the strategy
thoughtful i all the way through the game.
6 We may understand the concept in the following way. Given an arbitrary state
transition model M = (G, v) and a strategy S of player i in M , let M ′ be another
state transition model that is exactly the same asM except for the legality of actions
for player i in such a way that the legality relation l′ in M ′ is l ∩ S, where l is the
legality relation inM . We then viewM ′ as the reduction ofM once player i complies
with strategy S.
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OBSERVATION 5. LetM be a state transition model for the CrossDot
game with k = 2 and m > 2. Assume that player i takes the first turn.
If M complies with the strategy Si(thoughtful i) by player i, then
M |= terminal→ wins(1)
In other words, player i wins as long as he takes the first turn and
follows the strategy rule thoughtful i.
Proof: Without loss of generality, we assume that i = 1. We have to
show that M, δ |= terminal→ wins(i) for any reachable path δ. Since
the definitions of terminal and wins do not contain does, legal and©
(cf. formulas (6) & (7)), we only need to show for any reachable terminal
state we (which is a special case of a reachable path)M,we |= wins(1).
To this end, we assume a complete path δ = w0
a0→ w1
a1→ · · ·
ae−1
→ we,
where w0 = w¯ and we ∈ t. Since player 1 has the first turn and plays
with strategy thoughtful1, the action the player takes in the initial state
must be a12, i.e., a0 = a
1
2. If player 2 responds with action a
2
1, i.e.,
a1 = a
2
1, player 1 will then take action a
1
3 and win the game at state
w3. If player 2 responds with any other action, player 1 will take a
1
1
and also will win the game. In any case, δ ends up with we = w3
in which player 1 wins. Therefore M,we |= wins(1). We conclude
M |= terminal→ wins(1).
The strategy thoughtful seems like a “smart” strategy that can guar-
antee a winning state for the player who takes the first turn when k = 2.
However it is less mighty when taken by the second player, in which
case the strategy cannot even compete the following “trivial” strategy
fill leftmost i = cim △ · · · △ c
i
1 (19)
where cij was defined in Example 5.
OBSERVATION 6. Let M be a state transition model for a CrossDot
game with k = 2 and m > 2. If M complies with S1(fill leftmost1) by
Player 1 and with S2(thoughtful 2) by Player 2, then
M |= terminal→ wins(1)
Proof: It is not hard to prove that fill leftmost1 is functional. Since
thoughtful2 is also functional, there is only one complete path in the
game:
(1, 0,2,2,2,2, · · · ,2)
a1
1→ (0, 1,⊠,2,2,2, · · · ,2)
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a2
3→ (1, 0,⊠,2,⊡,2, · · · ,2)
a1
2→ (0, 1,⊠,⊠,⊡,2, · · · ,2)
which implies that player 1 takes the left most box, followed by player
2 fills an isolated box and finally player 1 fills the second box and
wins. We can easily verify that terminal → wins(1) is valid with any
segment of the path in M .
The failure of thoughtful is not because it is not “smart” enough but
because the thoughtful 2 strategy requires to fill an isolated box at the
first move, which provides the first player with a chance to win.
6.2. Reasoning About Other Players’ Strategies
The examples of strategies we have shown up to now are all from a
single player’s viewpoint, which is obviously not sufficient. We should
also reason about other players’ strategies.
From Observation 6 we learnt that a player should check for existing
threats before applying any “aggressive” strategy, like thoughtful . The
following formula defines a defence strategy, which says that if my
opponent can win by filling box j at next step, then I should mark
it now to prevent an immediate loss:
defencei =
m∧
j=1
(©(does(a−ij ) ∧©wins(−i))→ does(a
i
j)) (20)
where −i stands for the opponent of i. Note that defencei is neither de-
terministic nor complete. To create a functional strategy with defence,
we let
cautious i = (defencei△cim △ · · · △ c
i
1) ▽ thoughtful
i (21)
Obviously, defencei △ cim △ · · · △ c
i
1 is deterministic. Since thoughtful
i
is functional, therefore cautious i is functional.
The following observation shows that if the second player plays
cautious2, which means to protect himself before attacking his op-
ponent, then player 1 cannot win with the fill leftmost strategy (cf.
equation (19)).
OBSERVATION 7. LetM be a state transition model for the CrossDot
game with k = 2 and m > 2. If M complies with S1(fill leftmost1) by
Player 1 and with S2(cautious2) by Player 2, then
M |= terminal→ ¬wins(1)
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Proof: Since both players’ strategies are functional, there is only
one complete path in the game. Assume that the complete path is
δ = w0
a0→ w1
a1→ · · ·
ae−1
→ we. The first action taken by player 1 must be
a0 = a
1
1. The first two states in the path is then
w0 = (1, 0,2,2,2,2, · · · ,2) and w1 = (0, 1,⊠,2,2,2, · · · ,2)
To know which action player 2 chooses at state w1, we calculate
S2(defence2)↾w1 . In fact, we will show that S
2(defence2)↾w1= {(w1, a
2
2)}.
Assume any reachable path δ′ ∈ (w1, a
2
2)
;. We verify
M, δ′ |=
m∧
j=1
(©(does(a1j ) ∧©wins(1))→ does(a
2
j ))
This is obviously true because if j = 2, then does(a2j ) is satisfied. For
any 2 < j ≤ m, ©(does(a1j ) ∧©wins(1)) is false.
Next we show that for any a1 6= a
2
2, (w1, a1) 6∈ S
2(defence2)↾w1 . Let
δ′ = w1
a1→ w′2
a1
2→ w′3. It is easy to verify that
M, δ′ |=©(does(a12) ∧©wins(1)) ∧ ¬does(a
2
2)
It follows that
M, δ′ 6|=
m∧
j=1
(©(does(a1j ) ∧©wins(1))→ does(a
2
j ))
Note that δ′ ∈ (w1, a1)
;. Therefore we have
M 6|=(w1,a1)
m∧
j=1
(©(does(a1j ) ∧©wins(1))→ does(a
2
j ))
which implies (w1, a1) 6∈ S
2(defence2)↾w1 . This completes the proof that
S2(defence2) ↾w1= {(w1, a
2
2)}. Hence, for the complete path δ we find
that a1 = a
2
2 and w2 = (1, 0,⊠,⊡,2,2, · · · ,2). The game continues
in the same way until all boxes are filled without a winner.
The instances of the CrossDot game we considered above are limited
to the simple case where k = 2. In the following, we proposed a solution
to the game in the general setting where k can be any number larger
than 2 (and ≤ m). Consider the following strategies:
− Fill a box next to an opponent’s box:
fill o next i = (
∨
1≤j<m(¬p
1
j ∧ ¬p
2
j ∧ p
−i
j+1 ∧ does(a
i
j)))
▽(
∨
1<j≤m(¬p
1
j ∧ ¬p
2
j ∧ p
−i
j−1 ∧ does(a
i
j)))
Note that priority is given to the left empty box if exists.
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− Passive defence:
passive defencei=((defence i△fill o next i)▽fill any i)△ cim△ · · ·△c
i
1
(22)
Note that we use prioritised conjunction, instead of disjunction,
to combine defence and fill o next . This is because defence gives
arbitrary actions whenever there is no immediate loss for player i,
in which case fill o next takes over.
The following observation shows that such a passive defence strategy
guarantees no loss for a player no matter whether it is taken by the
first player or the second player, and no matter what the strategy of
the other player, for any instance of the CrossDot game with k > 2 and
m > 2.
OBSERVATION 8. Let M be a state transition model for a CrossDot
game with k > 2 and m ≥ k. If M complies with Si(passive defencei)
by player i, then
M |= terminal→ ¬win(−i)
where −i represents the opponent player of i. In other words, a player
never loses as long as he plays the passive defence strategy.
Proof: Obviously we only have to consider the case when k = 3
because if a strategy can help a player effectively blocking his opponent
to own three consecutive boxes, he can also block his opponent to form
any longer line of consecutive boxes. Also if we can prove the strategy to
be effective for player 2, it is sufficient to show that it is also effective for
player 1 because he can make his first move at random and then copy
player 2’s no-loss strategy (strategy stealing). Altogether this allows us
to restrict the proof to k = 3 and i = 2.
It is easy to show that passive defence2 is functional. To show M |=
terminal → ¬win(1), we only have to verify that for any complete
path δ = w0
a0→ w1
a1→ · · ·
ae−1
→ we, we have M,we |= ¬win(1). Recall
that we is a special reachable path that contains only the terminal
state we. If we is a winning state for player 2 or a tie state, we have
M,we |= ¬win(1).
Suppose by contradiction that we is a winning state of player 1.
It then turns out e is an odd number and there are at least three
consecutive crosses in some states along the complete path δ. In other
words, there must be a cross next to two other crosses. However, we will
show by induction on the length of the path that this can never happen.
More precisely, we claim that in each state w2j(0 ≤ j ≤ (e−1)/2), each
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box filled with a cross must be either adjacent to a box with a dot or at
an end (left or right) of the line, meanwhile the box on its left, if any,
must not be empty. Note that if the claim is true in we−1, then player
1 cannot win in state we no matter which action he chooses in state
we−1.
Obviously the claim holds when j = 0 because all boxes are empty
in the initial state w0. Now we assume that the claim holds in state
w2(j−1) where j ≤ (e− 1)/2. We show that the claim also holds at w2j .
Suppose that the action a2(j−1) that player 1 took in state w2(j−1)
was a1v, i.e., a2(j−1) = a
1
v. Obviously this action can at most affect sat-
isfaction of the claim on the box itself or its two immediate neighbours,
i.e., v− 1, v and v+ 1 (if exists). Therefore we only consider the effect
of player 1’s action a1v on these three possible boxes.
If box v is not at the right end, by the induction assumption, box
v + 1 can never be with a cross in state w2(j−1); otherwise box v were
not empty thus a1v were not doable. Therefore box v + 1 (if exists)
satisfies the claimed conditions in state w2j .
We then consider satisfaction of boxes v− 1 and v with three cases:
i). If box v−1 (if exists) has been filled with a dot, both boxes v−1
and v satisfy the conditions of the claim, which remain true in state
w2j.
ii). If box v − 1 has been already filled with a cross before state
w2(j−1), by induction assumption, box v− 1 is either at the left end or
next to a box with a dot on its left. In both situations, box v−1 satisfies
the claimed conditions that remain true in state w2j . After player 1
fills box v with a cross in state w2(j−1), player 2 must respond with
action a2j−1 = a
2
v+1 by applying defence
2 in state w2j−1 to prevent
an immediate loss unless the box v is at the right end or v + 1 has
already occupied by a dot. In both cases, box v satisfies the claimed
conditions in state w2j . Note that the claim guarantees that defence
2
is not applicable to any other boxes.
iii). If box v − 1 was empty in state w2(j−1), by the construction of
passive defencei, player 2 must respond with action a2v−1 either because
v− 1 is an immediate loss position or by applying strategy fill o next2
after player 1 fills box v. After v− 1 filled with a dot, both boxes v− 1
and v satisfy the claim in state w2j . Note that defence
2△fill o next2 is
not applicable to any box other than v− 1 (note that fill o next2 gives
priority to the left empty box.
We have verified the claim holds in each state w2j (0 ≤ j ≤ (e−1)/2),
including state we−1, which implies that the player 2 does not lose in
state we.
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Note that the defence strategy (cf. equation (20)) plays a crucial role
in the solution. Assume that a game gets into the following situation
after a few moves:
⊡,⊠,2,2,⊡,⊠,⊠,2, · · ·
and it is player 2’s turn. If player 2 does not have the defence strategy
but simply use fill o next2 to black the opponent, he would take action
a23 instead of a
2
8, which gives player 1 a chance to win.
The strategy passive defence can effectively prevent from losing but
it is hard to win because it does not encode any winning strategy. The
reader is invited to extend the strategy with more aggressive rules so
that if the other player is “not that smart”, it can have a chance to
win.
7. Computing With Strategies
We now turn to the question of how to actually compute with strategy
rules. Generally speaking, the conceptual simplicity of our language and
the fact that it is not tied to a specific action formalism should make
it easy to incorporate knowledge of strategies into various methods for
the design and analysis of intelligent agents. To illustrate this, we will
adopt here a very general calculus for reasoning about actions, the
Situation Calculus (see, e.g., (Reiter, 2001)), and show how our strat-
egy representation can be easily integrated. Reasoning problems about
strategies can take different forms, and we will specifically consider two
of them. First, we will show how the calculus can be used to infer the
possible outcomes of a game given information about the strategies of
all players. Second, we will illustrate how players can reason about the
strategies of opponents to infer their best course of action. We will also
show how our variant of the Situation Calculus forms the basis for an
encoding of game rules and a restricted class of strategies as Answer
Set Programs.
7.1. Example: Situation Calculus
The Situation Calculus is a formalism for reasoning about actions and
change that is based on classical predicate logic with a few pre-defined
language elements:
− s0, a constant denoting the initial situation; and Do(α, σ), a con-
structor denoting the situation resulting from doing action α in
situation σ;
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− Holds(ϕ, σ), a predicate denoting that fluent ϕ (i.e., an atomic
state feature) is true in situation σ;
− Poss(α, σ), a predicate denoting that action α is possible in situ-
ation σ.
For our purpose, we extend the base language of the Situation Calcu-
lus by the two game-specific predicates Wins(ι, σ) and Terminal(σ)
meaning, respectively, that the game is won for player ι in situation σ
and that σ is a terminal game position. With this, any axiom in our
game specification language can be easily rewritten for the Situation
Calculus similar to an existing mapping of the Game Description Lan-
guage (GDL) into this calculus (Schiffel and Thielscher, 2011). To this
end, let A and S be two distinct variables (standing for any action and
situation, respectively), then a formula ϕ in our language L can be
translated into a Situation Calculus axiom ϕSC [A,S] by the following
inductive definition:
pSC [A,S] := Holds(p, S)
(¬ϕ)SC [A,S] := ¬ϕSC [A,S]
(ϕ ∧ ψ)SC [A,S] := ϕSC [A,S] ∧ ψSC [A,S]
does(a)SC [A,S] := A = a
legal(a)SC [A,S] := Poss(a, S)
wins(i)SC [A,S] := Wins(i, S)
(©ϕ)SC [A,S] := (∀A′)ϕSC [A′,Do(A,S)]
initSC [A,S] := S = s0
terminalSC [A,S] := Terminal(S)
EXAMPLE 1 (continued) Recall the specification of the game in Ex-
ample 1. Applying the construction from above to formulas (4)–(11)
yields the following, after some slight syntactic simplifications.
¬Holds(pij , s0)
Holds(turn(1), s0) ∧ ¬Holds(turn(2), s0)
Wins(i, S) ≡
m−k+1∨
j=1
j+k−1∧
l=j
Holds(pil, S)
Terminal(S) ≡Wins(1, S) ∨Wins(2, S)∨
(
∧
1≤j≤m(Holds(p
1
j , S) ∨Holds(p
2
j , S)))
(¬(Holds(p1j , S) ∨Holds(p
2
j , S))∧
Holds(turn(i), S) ∧ ¬Terminal(S)) ≡ Poss(aij , S)
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Holds(pij, S) ∨A = a
i
j ≡ Holds(p
i
j ,Do(A,S))
Holds(turn(1), S)→ ¬Holds(turn(1),Do(A,S))∧
Holds(turn(2),Do(A,S))
Holds(turn(2), S)→ ¬Holds(turn(2),Do(A,S))∧
Holds(turn(1),Do(A,S))
7.2. Adding Strategy Rules
As a general logic-based formalism, the Situation Calculus allows for
a straightforward encoding of strategy rules with the help of a direct
encoding of their interpretation according to (12) and Definition 8,
respectively. Based on the rewriting rules from above, the Situation
Calculus encoding r[A,S] for a strategy rule r over language L is
inductively obtained as follows, where A and S are variables.
ϕ[A,S] := Poss(A,S) ∧ ϕSC [A,S]
(r1 ▽ r2 ▽ . . .▽ rn)[A,S] :=
r1[A,S]
∨
r2[A,S] ∧ ¬(∃A
′) r1[A
′, S]
∨ . . . ∨
rn[A,S] ∧ ¬(∃A
′) (r1[A
′, S] ∨ . . . ∨ rn−1[A
′, S])
(r1 △ r2 △ . . . △ rn)[A,S] :=
r1[A,S] ∧ ¬(∃A
′) (r1[A
′, S] ∧ r2[A
′, S])
∨
r1[A,S] ∧ r2[A,S] ∧ ¬(∃A
′) (r1[A
′, S] ∧ r2[A
′, S] ∧ r3[A
′, S])
∨ . . . ∨
r1[A,S] ∧ r2[A,S] ∧ . . . ∧ rn[A,S]
7.3. Computing with Strategies: Examples
The representation of strategy rules in the Situation Calculus can be
used to define a special predicate, which we denote by Strat(α, σ),
whose intended meaning is that it is possible according to some player’s
strategy to take action α in situation σ. Consider, for example, a given
set of complete strategy rules {r1, . . . , rn} for each player, then this can
be embedded into a Situation Calculus encoding of a game as follows:
Strat(A,S) ≡ r1[A,S] ∨ . . . ∨ rn[A,S]
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Such information about strategies can be used for a variety of pur-
poses. Specifically, as we will briefly illustrate next, it can be used to
infer possible outcomes of a game under a given set of strategy rules
or help a player to decide on a course of action by reasoning about
opponents’ strategies.
Inferring possible outcomes. Based on the predicate Strat, the set
of all possible playouts of a game according to players’ strategies can
be recursively defined as follows.
Strategic(s0)
Strategic(S) ∧ Strat(A,S) → Strategic(Do(A,S))
This predicate determines all paths that are reachable if all players
follow their given strategy rules. Hence, all possible playouts under
these strategies can be determined as all situations S that satisfy
Strategic(S) ∧Terminal(S).
Reasoning about opponents’ strategies. Another way of using reason-
ing about strategies is for players to use knowledge or belief about
their opponents’ strategies in order to compute their own best course
of actions in response. As an example, we will consider the encoding of
a generalised form of Minimax evaluation in the Situation Calculus. To
this end, let us take the perspective of particular player i and assume
that this player’s belief about the opponents’ strategy rules is encoded
using predicate Strat as above. Let us assume also that Turn(i, S)
expresses the fact that it is player i’s turn in situation S. We can then
define recursively the notion of a winning situation for i, represented
by predicate Win(S), as follows:
Wins(i, S) → Win(S) (23)
Turn(i, S) ∧ (∃A)(Poss(A,S) ∧Win(Do(A,S)))
→ Win(S)
(24)
¬Turn(i, S) ∧ (∀A)(Strat(A,S)→Win(Do(A,S)))
→ Win(S)
(25)
According to this definition, a situation is winnable for our player i
if he can choose a course of action whenever it is his turn, (24), such
that if all other players choose their actions according to their strategy,
(25), then a terminal situation will be reached in which player i has
won, (23).
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1 action (a(I,J)).
2
3 holds (turn (1) ,0).
4 legal (a(I,J),T) :- not holds (p(1,J),T), holds(turn(I),T),
5 not holds(p(2,J),T), not terminal (T).
6 holds (p(I,J), T+1) :- holds(p(I,J),T).
7 holds (p(I,J), T+1) :- does(a(I,J)).
8 holds (turn (1),T+1) :- holds(turn(2),T).
9 holds (turn (2),T+1) :- holds(turn(1),T).
10
11 wins(I,T) :- holds (p(I,J),T), ..., holds(p(I,J+k),T).
12 terminal (T) :- wins(I,T).
13 terminal (T) :- not freecell (T).
14 freecell (T) :- not holds(p(1,J)), not holds (p(2,J)).
15
16 1 { does(A,T) : action (A) } 1.
17 :- does(A,T), not legal (A,T).
18
19 :- non_strategic(T).
20 non_strategic(T) :- does(A,T), not strat (A,T).
21
22 strat (A,T) :- fill_next (A,T).
23 strat (A,T) :- not exists_fill_next(T), fill_any (A,T).
24 fill_next (a(I,J),T) :- holds (p(I,J-1),T), legal(a(I,J),T),
25 not holds (p(1,J),T), not holds (p(2,J),T).
26 fill_next (a(I,J),T) :- holds (p(I,J+1),T), legal(a(I,J),T),
27 not holds (p(1,J),T), not holds (p(2,J),T).
28 exists_fill_next(T) :- fill_next (A,T).
29 fill_any (a(I,J),T) :- legal (a(I,J),T).
Figure 1. An ASP encoding of the game from Example 1, including a strategy rule.
For the sake of brevity, we have omitted the domain definitions for variables I , J ,
and T (the latter ranging from 0 to a given time horizon).
7.4. Computing with Strategies in ASP
Under specific conditions, problems that require reasoning about games
and strategies can be solved by Answer Set Programming (ASP). This
general technique provides a way of computing models for logic pro-
grams for which particularly efficient implementations have been devel-
oped in the recent past, such as (Gebser et al., 2011) just to mention
one. ASP has been used successfully for reasoning about actions and
plan generation (see, e.g., (Lifschitz, 2002)) as well as for endgame
search in general game playing (Thielscher, 2009). In this section, we
build on these existing methods and show how ASP can be used to
compute all possible outcomes of a game under given strategies for the
players. We assume the reader to be familiar with basic notions and
notations of ASP, as can be found in (Gelfond, 2008).
The standard use of ASP for computing with actions is to replace the
branching time structure of the Situation Calculus by linear time. For
deterministic games with complete specification of the initial state and
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a given time horizon, the game rules can be encoded as an ASP in such
a way that each answer set corresponds to a reachable path and vice
versa (see, e.g., (Thielscher, 2009)). For our running example game,
Figure 7.4 (lines 1–18) constitute an ASP encoding that follows this
principle. Specifically, the so-called weight atom in clause 16 requires
each answer set to include one, and only one, action at each point in
time. The so-called constraint in clause 17 rules out any answer set in
which the chosen action is not legal.
A given ASP that provides a linear-time encoding of a game can
be extended by encodings of strategy rules for the players so that the
answer sets comply with the strategies. This provides a computational
method for inferring the possible outcomes of a game under a given set
of strategies.
Provided it does not include the ©-operator, any strategy ϕ in
our language that can be encoded in this linear way according to the
following inductive coding scheme. Let n be a unique predicate name
that stands for (the satisfaction of) ϕ, then:
ϕ encoding
p n(A, T) :- holds(p, T).
¬ψ1 n(A, T) :- not n1(A, T).
ψ1 ∧ ψ2 n(A, T) :- n1(A, T), n2(A, T).
does(a) n(A, T) :- A = a.
legal(a) n(A, T) :- legal(a, T).
wins(i) n(A, T) :- wins(i, T).
init n(A, T) :- T = 0.
terminal n(A, T) :- terminal(T).
ψ1 ▽ψ2▽ . . . ▽ψm n(A, T) :- n1(A, T).
n(A, T) :- n2(A, T), not n
′(T).
n(A, T) :- n3(A, T), not n
′′(T).
. . .
n′(T) :- n1(A
′, T).
n′′(T) :- n2(A
′, T).
. . .
ψ1 △ ψ2 △ . . . △ ψm n(A, T) :- n1(A, T), not n
′(T).
n(A, T) :- n1(A, T), n2(A, T), not n
′′(T).
. . .
n′(T) :- n1(A
′, T), n2(A
′, T).
n′′(T) :- n1(A
′, T), n2(A
′, T), n3(A
′, T).
. . .
Where necessary, this is accompanied by clauses with head ni to encode
the sub-formulas ψi (for i = 1, 2, . . .), which are obtained inductively.
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Clauses 19–29 in Figure 7.4 are an example of applying this encoding
in order to constrain the answer sets for our CrossDot game to those
where both players i follow the simple strategy (fill nexti)▽(fill any i)
(cf. Example 4): Constraint 19 in conjunction with clause 20 rejects all
answer sets that do not comply with the strategy definition. Clauses 24–
27 encode the first part of the strategy rule for both players (in a slightly
more compact form than obtained by strictly applying the coding
scheme from above), and clause 23, in conjunction with clauses 28–29,
encodes the second part.
7.5. Further extensions and computational complexity
The encoding scheme from above does not extend to strategies that
include the©-operator since their evaluation requires a counterfactual
lookahead. Hence, they cannot be directly represented in an ASP based
on a linear time structure. There are two conceivable ways to overcome
this limitation.
1. If the axiomatisation of a game supports the definition of a re-
gression operator similar to the one in the standard Situation Cal-
culus (Reiter, 1991), then any strategy of the form ©ϕ can be
regressed to a formula ϕ′ that is logically equivalent under the
game axioms and contains one less occurrence of the ©-operator.
The repeated application of regression will yield a ©-free formula,
which then can be encoded in the same way as above.
2. Alternatively, we can extend the linear time structure to allow for
more than one sequence of actions in a single same answer set.
A similar approach has been shown to be practically viable for
proving epistemic properties in general games using ASPs (Haufe
and Thielscher, 2012).
A detailed formalisation and analysis of either solution goes beyond
the scope of this paper and is left for future work.
Up to now we have demonstrated with two example implementations
how our formalism supports automated reasoning. With regard to the
efficiency of the implementations, we can consider different aspects re-
garding both the description of strategies and the problem of reasoning
about them.
The complexity of translating a strategy in our language to situ-
ation calculus is linear, and so is the translation to ASP for ©-free
strategy rules. However, generally speaking it is unrealistic to expect
high efficiency for a generic strategy reasoning mechanism because in
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theory, as an extension of GDL, our language can describe any finite
game with perfect information. Verifying an arbitrary strategy such
as, “try any possible action to win,” is equivalent to solving a game
and therefore equally complex. It is well known that the complexity of
finding a winning strategy for complex games like Japanese Go, which
can be specified in GDL, is EXPTIME-complete (Robson, 1983).
Moreover, the computational complexity of solving a game some-
times is independent of the length of the game description and the
strategies that are used to solve the game. Therefore, a complexity
analysis for domain-independent strategy reasoning mechanisms can be
meaningless.7 However, it is possible that certain restrictions on both
game descriptions and strategy rules may lead to specific upper bounds
for the computational complexity of solving these games. Restrictions
on the number of lookahead steps can also affect the complexity of
reasoning. In addition, since our strategies represent some ideas of
how to play a game well, it is possible that we express these ideas in
our language and design specific algorithms to automatically generate
possible moves that correspond to the ideas. The efficiency of these
algorithms is crucial to the design of a game player. We leave these
issues for future investigation.
8. Related Work
Modelling and specifying strategies is a fundamental research theme in
game theory. Researchers in artificial intelligence have recently joined
in the research but mostly focus on modelling of strategic reasoning
with the help of logical approaches. A number of logical frameworks
have been proposed in the literature for strategy representation and
reasoning (Pauly, 2002; Alur et al., 2002; Goranko and Van Drimme-
len, 2006; Chatterjee et al., 2010; Mogavero et al., 2010; van Ben-
them, 2013). Most of the frameworks were built on either Coalition
Logic (CL), Alternating-Time Temporal Logic (ATL), or Propositional
Dynamic Logic (PDL).
Both coalition logic (Pauly, 2002) and alternating-time temporal
logic (Alur et al., 2002) were developed to model strategic abilities
of coalitions in multi-agent systems. The modality 〈C〉ϕ (or 〈C〉©ϕ)
expresses that “a group of agents, C, has a joint strategy to bring
about ϕ no matter what strategies the other agents choose”. In CL, a
strategy of a player is simply an action available to the player. In ATL,
a strategy is a function that maps a sequence of states to an action
7 For instance, the description of game rules for Chinese Go is quite similar to
the one for Japanese Go but their complexity is significantly different.
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(in ATL). In both logics, strategies stay on the semantic level without
syntactical representation.
A number of extensions of either CL or ATL aim to bring strate-
gies to the syntactical level. van der Hoek et al. (2005) proposed an
extension of ATL, named CATL for Counterfactual ATL, with a varia-
tion to the coalition modality, Ci(σ, ϕ), representing the counterfactual
statement, “if agent i had committed to a strategy σ, then ϕ would
hold”. Strategies in that framework can be explicitly represented on
the syntactical level using dynamic logic-like modalities, even though
program connectives of dynamic logic are not allowed to be used for
combining strategies. Walther et al. (2007) refine the work of CATL
into an axiomatic logical system with a different semantics. However,
strategies are still restricted to primitive forms, which means that the
combination of strategies is not supported. Similar restrictions have
also been applied in several other ATL- or CL-like logical frameworks
for strategic reasoning, such as (Chatterjee et al., 2010; Mogavero et al.,
2010; Lorini, 2010).
Another approach to strategy representation and reasoning is to
treat a strategy as a program so that PDL-style program connectives
can be used to combine strategies (van Benthem, 2001; Ramanujam
and Simon, 2008; van Benthem, 2013). van Benthem proposed a logical
framework, named Temporal Forcing Logic (TFL), with a modality
[σ, i]ϕ, meaning that “player i applies strategy σ, against any play of
the others, to force the game to a state in which ϕ holds”, where a strat-
egy can be defined as any PDL program. Similar proposal can also be
found in (Ramanujam and Simon, 2008). Such an “intuitive analogue to
strategies” provides a close approximation to strategy representation;
nevertheless, a strategy has essential differences from a program, which
requires specific ways of composition and reasoning as we have shown
in the previous sections.
We like to stress that our treatment of strategies is different from
all of the abovementioned approaches in the following aspects. Firstly,
we can use the same propositional formulas for different purposes. A
propositional formula with the standard semantics of propositional
modal logic can represent properties of the game state and be used
in domain-dependent axioms. But we also represent a strategy with
the help of a propositional formula, by endowing the formula with a
specific semantics. This makes strategy design much easier and efficient.
Secondly, we view a strategy as a set of possible moves, i.e., a set of
state-action pairs, rather than a function from a state (or a sequence
of states) to an action. In this sense, our strategies represent “rough
ideas”, which can then be combined and refined. Thirdly, instead of
using PDL-style program connectives, we introduced two prioritised
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connectives for combining strategies, which, as we have seen, provides
for a very natural and convenient design of strategies.
We want to mention that the idea of the prioritised disjunction was
inspired by Brewka et al.’s (2004) Qualitative Choice Logic (QCL).
QCL contains a non-standard propositional connective A−→×B with the
meaning, “A if possible; but if A is impossible then at least B”. We
found that the semantics of the connective fits strategies very well.
It is an interesting question for future work whether our prioritised
conjunction can be integrated into QCL.
9. Conclusion
In this paper we have introduced a logical language to describe, com-
pose and combine strategies for game-playing agents. The language
derives from the general Game Description Language (GDL) and ex-
tends it by a single temporal operator © and two new prioritised
connectives: ▽ and △. The basic components of GDL facilitate the
representation of initial and terminal conditions, winning criteria and
legality of actions (i.e., preconditions). The temporal operator allows
us to describe the effects of actions. These form the basic language for
describing game- and player-specific strategies. The newly introduced
connectives allow us to combine simple strategies into more complicated
and refined ones. When we use the language to describe a strategy, we
endow it with a specific semantics so that we can compose a strategy
in a logical way and the actual moves the strategy represents can be
generated in an automatic way.
We have thoroughly analysed the properties of the language. In
fact, the nice properties in particular of the new connectives give us
great freedom in practice for strategy design: we can start with a
strategy that formalises one specific idea. If it is too restricted, we
can extend it with more generic ones using the prioritised disjunction,
and if it is too generic, we can refine it with more specific strategies
using the prioritised conjunction. We have shown also how strategies
can be embedded into existing methods for the design and analysis
of intelligent agents in order to solve problems that involve reasoning
about strategies, including the computation of possible outcomes of
games under given strategies.
Our current implementation for strategy reasoning combines rea-
soning about actions and change with an encoding of game rules and
strategies using Answer Set Programming. It would be more efficient
to develop a specific method of model checking based on the structure
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of our state transition model and the syntax of strategy composition.
We leave this for future work.
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